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Abstract
US free trade agreements comprise unique provisions that enable civil society to present public complaints against labor
rights violations occurring in the US or its trade partners. To date, a variety of complainants have used these mechanisms,
including (inter)national trade unions, human rights organizations, and a priest. And yet, little is known about the sub-
missions’ nature of agency and the effects it has on the procedural continuations to address illicit labor practices. To
fill this research lacuna, this article employs a multidisciplinary framework of ‘actorness’ that measures the submitters’
diversity (professionalism/non-professionalism, collectivism/individualism, transnationalism/nationalism) and their effec-
tiveness (rejection/acceptance of submissions and further procedural follow-ups). Combining quantitative examination
with in-depth analysis of two diverse cases of actorness, and drawing on expert interviews, public reports, and minutes
of meetings, the study reveals that the majority of public submissions were of professional, collective, and transnational
nature. However, contrary to what extant literature suggests, this is not a guarantee that they achieve more far-reaching
procedural steps in the protection of workers. Non-professional, individual, and national actorness can compensate for
the advantages of professionalism, collectivism, and transnationalism.
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1. Introduction
Since the end of World War II in particular, an inclusive
international system has emerged. It comprises interna-
tional institutions such as tribunals that provide direct
access and influence to civil society actors and organi-
zations (Hall, Jacoby, Levy, & Meunier, 2014, p. 14; Keo-
hane, Moravcsik, & Slaughter, 2000, p. 465).
With the entry into force of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its side agreement,
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC), in 1994, a new era of labor advocacy has be-
gun. It was the first international trade accord which en-
abled civil society actors to present complaints with re-
spect to workers’ rights violations. Since the NAALC, all
US-signed trade agreements have included similar inclu-
sive complaint procedures: Chronologically, these are US
bilateral trade agreements with Jordan, Chile, Singapore,
Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, and Oman; the regional
Central American–Dominican Republic Free Trade Agree-
ment (CAFTA–DR) with Costa Rica, the Dominican Repub-
lic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua; and
bilateral trade agreementswith Peru, Columbia, Panama,
and South Korea. They entered into force between 2001
and 2012. The opportunity for civil society actors to
present a labor rights complaint in the context of the
NAALC and subsequently concluded US FTAs is defined
in a Federal Register Note that reads as follows: ‘Any per-
son may file a submission with the OTLA [Office of Trade
and Labor Affairs, US Department of Labor] regarding an-
other Party’s commitments or obligations arising under
a labor chapter [of US FTAs] or Part Two of the NAALC’.1
1 A submission has to meet certain criteria. See US Federal Register, available at https://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/pdf/2006021837.pdf
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When determining the conditions for effective func-
tioning and impact of labor rights promotion through US
trade instruments, extant literature has mainly focused
on structural and political shortcomings of the enforce-
ment procedure (Nolan García, 2011a, pp. 104–105; Van
Roozendaal, 2015, pp. 26–27; Weiss, 2003). The nature
of the actors who submit these complaints, however,
has hardly gained attention as potential influencing fac-
tor.2 Such a view becomes all the more relevant since
the complaint procedure is ‘a flexible, accessible instru-
ment that labor rights advocates can creatively exploit’
(Compa, 2002, p. 156). The comparatively low restriction
for admittance provides opportunities for civil society ac-
tors of various professional, social, and national back-
grounds, characteristics that are likely to influence the
success of their engagement (see also Freeman & Her-
sch, 2005; Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Risse, 2000).
This study is the first to systematically and compre-
hensively assess the nature of labor rights complainants
in the context of US FTAs. Drawing on an original multi-
disciplinary theoretical framework of actorness, charac-
terized by professionalism, collectivism, and transnation-
alism, I provide a differentiated assessment of the com-
plaining parties of the 31 labor submissions presented
at the OTLA, US Department of Labor (USDOL). I discuss
two diverse cases with regard to their actorness and how
they affected the submissions’ continuations towards
better working conditions: They are the 2011 submission
against the Mexican Government under the NAALC and
the 2011 submission against the Government of the Do-
minican Republic under the CAFTA–DR. Data is derived
from qualitative, semi-structured expert interviews, and
official public reports and minutes of meetings.
The quantitative assessment reveals that labor rights
submissions directed at the US in the context of US
FTAs are largely dominated by professional (trade unions
and/or their confederations), collective (more than one
complaining party), and transnational (multi- and/or in-
ternational origin) complainants. In light of further in-
sights from the qualitative case study, it is argued that
these particularities of actorness, unlike extant research
suggests, do not automatically lead to the acceptance of
a public submission and further procedural steps. Com-
plaints of non-professional, individual, and national na-
ture can be likewise effective if they compensate for
the lack of professionalism’s, collectivism’s, and transna-
tionalism’s advantages (e.g., expertise, experience, legit-
imacy, and international attention).
2. Actorness in International Labor Politics
In order to bring structure into the mosaic of various ac-
tors presenting labor rights complaints in the framework
of US FTAs, a multidisciplinary theoretical framework is
developed in this section. It comprises three dichoto-
mous dimensions of actorness (i.e., professionalism/non-
professionalism; collectivism/individualism; transnation-
alism/nationalism) which are influential in international
policy making in general and labor rights advocacy in par-
ticular. Effectiveness in the context of this study reflects
whether US authorities accepted a public submission to
be reviewed. In so doing, a case is granted legal valid-
ity, which again makes further political and quasi-judicial
steps in the enforcement procedure possible.3 It is this
procedural stage where the submitters’ range of influ-
ence normally ends. In the qualitative case study, further
follow-ups (e.g., public reports of review, recommenda-
tions, monitoring) are considered as well.
2.1. Professionalism/Non-Professionalism
Today’s modern societies are shaped by a variety of pro-
fessions with unique expertise and interests. In the strug-
gle between labor and capital, trade unions and their con-
federations have traditionally been considered the ma-
jor actors transferring the claims of workers. As in many
other states, US trade unions have gained important
status since the 1930s: ‘The labor giants—the AFL-CIO
(American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations), the Teamsters, the UnitedMineWorkers,
and historic ones like the Industrial Workers of theWorld
or the Knights of Labor—these were venerable institu-
tions, part of our nation’s heritage’ (Dray, 2010, pp. 5–6).
It was in the mid-1950s, when unions in the US reached
their highest density, measured by the proportion of
workers of the total workforce who were union mem-
bers. Thereafter, their growth slowed down. Since the
mid-1970s, trade unions’ density has steadily declined,
leading to a weakening of their strength and influence
(Freeman & Hersch, 2005, p. 1). As far as the role of pro-
fessions in modern life is concerned, it is assumed that
limited efficacy makes a jurisdiction, understood as the
link between occupation and its work, vulnerable (Ab-
bott, 1988, p. 46). This can also be observed in the do-
main of labor: With the decline of trade unionism, new
labor rights institutions have emerged. They comprise le-
gal service centers, professional organizations, and hu-
man rights vigilances, including Amnesty International
USA, OxfamAmerica group, Human RightsWatch, Ameri-
cans for Democratic Action, and American Rights atWork
(Compa, 2008, pp. 230–234, 245; Freeman & Hersch,
2005, p. 6).
Accordingly, there is little doubt that trade unions do
not enjoy full jurisdiction, that is the complete, legally
established control over the fight for decent work. How-
ever, as the ability of a profession to sustain a jurisdic-
tion lies partly in the power and prestige of its knowledge
(Abbott, 1988, pp. 53–54), trade unions seem to have
advantages over other labor rights advocates who can-
not fully substitute for them (Freeman & Hersch, 2005, p.
4). As far as expertise is concerned, trade union leaders
can increase their skills in the realm of labor activism by
2 For exceptions see for instance Nolan García (2011b).
3 The procedural guidelines include ministerial consultations, arbitral panels, and economic sanctions.
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participating in executive training programs.4 Moreover,
being the voice of labor, trade unions have immediate
contact to workers who they represent and thus ac-
cess to relevant information from the ground (Freeman,
1976, p. 364). In terms of experience, they have had
greater chances to navigate through (and potentially un-
dergo learning processes regarding) international com-
plaint systems than other civil society actors. To illustrate,
the International Labor Organization (ILO), the UN spe-
cialized agency for labor rights matters, allows worker
and employer organizations to present complaints re-
garding labor rights violations. Several US trade unions
such as the AFL-CIO and the United Electrical, Radio, and
Machine Workers of America have made use of it by
(co-)filing complaints in the ILO system (Compa, 2008,
pp. 239–240).
Given trade unions’ lifetimemandate of labor protec-
tion, their expertise and experience, it can be assumed
that labor rights submissions of professional actors (i.e.,
[co-]presented by trade unions or their confederations)
in the context of US FTAs are more likely to be accepted
for review than those presented by non-professional
ones (i.e., other than trade unions).5
2.2. Collectivism/Individualism
States no longer have the monopoly over domestic and
international politics. Instead, in recent decades, a more
inclusive international systemhas emerged, providing ac-
cess and influence to a variety of civil society actors and
organizations (Hall et al., 2014, p. 14). In international
law, the right of individuals to present a complaint before
an international tribunal is institutionalized in various in-
ternational court systems (Keohane et al., 2000, p. 465).
In addition to the proliferating opportunities for in-
dividual voice in international politics, collective actors
such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multi-
national corporations, and foundations have gained in-
creased access to international organization bodies (Tall-
berg, Sommerer, Squatrito, & Jönsson, 2014, p. 747). Col-
lective forms of organization which feature voluntary,
reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication
and exchange are also referred to as advocacy networks
as ‘advocates plead the causes of others or defend a
cause or proposition: they are stand-ins for persons of
ideas’ (Keck & Sikkink, 1999, p. 91). Such collective en-
tities can include NGOs, research and advocacy organi-
zations; local social movements; foundations; the me-
dia; churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, in-
tellectuals; and state actors such as parts of the execu-
tive and parliamentary branches of governments (Keck
& Sikkink, 1999, pp. 91–92). Networks not only transfer
knowledge and know-how, but they can also contribute
to the better coordination of financial resources (Kidder,
2002, p. 290). Moreover, civil society coalitions are more
representative than individuals and hence increase legiti-
macy (Florini, 2000, p. 233) and cultivate a reputation for
credibility with the press (Keck & Sikkink, 1999, p. 96).
In the world of labor, Freeman (1976) presents sev-
eral reasons why collective rather than individual activ-
ity is necessary to effectively claim workers’ rights. First,
individuals expressing discontent in the workplace face
negative consequences, such as being fired. Retaliation
against the entire work force, however, is less likely. Sec-
ond, as working conditions have a communal nature,
their violations create a public goods problemwhich indi-
viduals can hardly solve on their own but rather through
collective action. Finally, labor rules require constant
monitoring by an entity which has expertise on employ-
ment contracts and represents workers. This is tradition-
ally thework of trade unions; individuals can hardly fulfill
this task on their own. In a nutshell, ‘the marginal costs
of exercising rights are likely to be lower for a group of
workers than for a single individual. This combination im-
plies that the outcome of individual actions is likely to be
inferior to the socially optimal level’ (Freeman & Hersch,
2005, p. 5).
Accordingly, it can be assumed that labor rights sub-
missions presented in the context of US FTAs collectively
(i.e., bymore than one complaining party) aremore likely
to be accepted for review than those presented individu-
ally (i.e., one complaining party).
2.3. Nationalism/Transnationalism
In addition to the increasing integration of domestic
civil society actors and organizations in advocacy groups,
there is also a tendency of growing cross-border rela-
tions. ‘Transnational advocacy networks’, as Keck and
Sikkink (1999) call them, operate across national bound-
aries on behalf of shared principles, ideas, and values.
Such alliances emerge as domestic groups often do not
have resources within domestic political or judicial sys-
tems. International coalitions may help in expressing
their concerns. Moreover, it increases the pressure on
states from outside, which is also called the ‘boomerang’
pattern of influence (Keck & Sikkink, 1999, p. 93). Accord-
ing to Risse (2000, p. 196), ‘transnational pressure turns
out to be the single most important cause of change to-
ward initial concessions by the norm-violating govern-
ment, even more important than pressure from other
governments’. In sensitive arenas in particular, transna-
tional advocacy also helps to protect the lives of domes-
tic civil society groups. In contrast to purely national ac-
tors and organizations, transnational coalitions have the
advantage to exchange funds and services, as well as
to generate relevant information quickly and accurately,
and to exchange it reciprocally and deploy it effectively
(Keck & Sikkink, 1999, pp. 92–93). Moreover, combining
civil society actors fromdifferent nationalities, themedia
coverage is likely to transcend borders and attract global
attention (see also Johnson, 2000, p. 62).
4 See for instance the Harvard Trade Union Program established in 1942, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/HTUPapply.html
5 This does not mean that organizations engaging in labor affairs other than trade unions do not work professionally.
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With the emergence of international labor rules at
the latest, transnational advocacy can also be found in
the domain of labor. It includes trade unions, NGOs, and
other labor rights advocates. As an illustration, telecom-
munication unions in the US, Mexico, and Canada built
an alliance to coordinate actions andmutually assist each
other. In the automobile industry, as another example,
trade unions in the US, Germany, and Brazil jointly en-
gaged in the formulation of similar, non-discriminatory
contracts among the countries. In addition to transna-
tional alliances of national groups, transnational advo-
cacy in the field of labor also occurs through regional
groups such as the European Trade Union Confeder-
ation and international groups such as Human Rights
Watch and the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (Trubek, Mosher, & Rothstein, 2000, pp. 1192–
1193, 1196–1197). According to Tilly (1995, p. 21), in
a globalizing world with powerful international capital,
‘only collective action at an international scale has much
prospect of providing gains for labor, or even of stem-
ming labor’s losses’. At the more regional level, transna-
tional advocacy is a significant factor for labor rights
complaints under the NAALC to be accepted for review
(Nolan García, 2011b, pp. 49–50).
Due to pressure from the outside, accurate informa-
tion collection, exchange of funds and services, as well
as international media attention, transnational networks
enjoy advantages that national networks do not have.
Accordingly, it can be assumed that labor rights submis-
sions presented in the context of US FTAs by a transna-
tional complaining party (i.e., of multi- or international
origin) are more likely to be accepted for review than
those presented by a purely national complaining party
(i.e., of national origin).
3. Labor Rights Protection in US FTAs: Does Actorness
Matter?
Since the entry into force of the US FTAs, more than 40 la-
bor rights complaints have been submitted to one of the
signing parties. A majority of these complaints, namely
31, were presented before the US OTLA, which is autho-
rized in the US to decide whether a submission is ac-
cepted for review. Figure 1 illustrates the number of sub-
missions and the accused governments presented at the
US OTLA between 1994 and 2016.
Regarding the nature of complainants, ‘submissions
come from a variety of sources’.6 As summarized in Fig-
ure 2, more than three quarters of the complaints were
(co-)filed by trade unions (or confederations thereof)
who traditionally enjoy the jurisdiction of workers’ rights
promotion. They cover sector-specific unions such as
the United Steelworkers and sector-transcending associ-
ations such as the AFL-CIO. Those complaints presented
without the involvement of trade union actors were de-
signed by new labor advocates, including Human Rights
Watch, the International Labor Rights Fund, United Stu-
dents Against Sweatshops, the National Association of
Democratic Lawyers, and legal service centers.
A grand part of the labor cases was not presented
by a single complaining entity but as a result of collec-
tive advocacy. They range from submissions filed by two
groups up to a network of over 90 signatory organiza-
tions. Those submissions filed by an individual entity—
with the exception of one case whose submitter was a
single person—are presented by one organization such
as the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of
America. Interestingly, with the exception of one sub-
mission presented by the International Brotherhood of
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Figure 1. Public submissions to US OTLA.
6 Interview, Director, OTLA, USDOL, June 12, 2013.
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Figure 2. Actorness in public submissions to US OTLA.
Teamsters, all of the individually submitted complaints
have a national source.
Overall, slightly more than three quarters of the sub-
missions have amulti-national origin. Either do they com-
bine groups of at least two different nationalities, such as
a joint complaint by the Association of Flight Attendants
of theUS and the Association of Flight Attendants ofMex-
ico, or they involve organizations with an international
base, such as the International Trade Union Confedera-
tion (ITUC), the International Labor Rights Education and
Research Fund, and Human Rights Watch.
In sum, it can be concluded that public labor rights
submissions to the US OTLA in the context of US FTAs
are largely filed by professional, collective, and transna-
tional complainants. To put it differently, the inclusive
complaint mechanism is notmerely used by national um-
brella trade unions, such as the AFL-CIO: ‘often times
people think this [complaint mechanism in US FTAs] is
really only an AFL-CIO vehicle….I think the longer that
these things are out there, the more creative…smaller
NGOs and…smaller unions will [use] them’.7 Even more,
the Director of the International Department at the AFL-
CIO claims that ‘it’s a mechanism that should be used by
others….We [AFL-CIO] don’t have a monopoly on the la-
bor mechanism’.8
Regarding the follow up of the public submissions,
four of the 31 complaints were withdrawn by the sub-
mitters themselves. The US OTLA declined seven and ac-
cepted 20 public submissions for review.9 Figure 3 illus-
trates the OTLA’s decisions with regard to the actorness
of the submissions in relative terms. The assessment re-
veals that submissions of professional nature, in contrast
to the theoretical assumptions, were accepted for re-
view less often than those of non-professional nature.
In line with the theoretical arguments, most of the col-
lectively filed submissions were approved by the OTLA
whereas only half of the individual submissions did. Fi-
nally, most submissions with a transnational base and
slightly less than half of the submissions with a national
nature were accepted for review, corroborating theoret-
ical suggestions.
In order to substantiate whether the nature of com-
plainants has an effect on the procedural follow-ups,
I conduct an in-depth case study with two diverse cases
with extreme values (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 300)
regarding the three-dimensional conceptualization of ac-
torness. They are the 2011 submissions against Mex-
ico and against the Dominican Republic, which differ
strongly in terms of complainants. While the submis-
sion against Mexico was filed by the Mexican Electri-
cal Workers Union (SME) together with 93 signatories,
including the AFL-CIO, the ITUC, and many grassroots
organizations (collectivism), it was an individual com-
plainant who accused the Dominican Republic of violat-
ing labor rights (individualism). Moreover, the former
comprises many sector-transcendent and sector-specific
trade unions, among other labor advocates (professional-
ism), whereas the latter came to the Dominican Repub-
lic as a catholic priest from Europe, lacking professional
labor rights authority (non-professionalism): The clergy’s
central jurisdictions comprise salvation, meaning, and ul-
timate concern. Only since the end of the last century
has it taken its treatments such as pastoral care, and su-
pervised church attendance and aimed them at other
kinds of problems, the first of which were social prob-
lems (Abbott, 1988, p. 100). The NAALC submission, fur-
thermore, was the result of a transnational alliance com-
prising several national and international organizations
(transnationalism), in contrast to the CAFTA–DR submis-
sion with its national origin (nationalism).
Despite differences in the complainants’ actorness,
the two cases feature similaritieswhich are important for
a comparative assessment. First, both labor complaints
were submitted in the same year, which is a necessary
7 Interview, Trade and Globalization Policy Specialist, AFL-CIO, June 14, 2013.
8 Interview, Director of the International Department, AFL-CIO, June 17, 2013.
9 Reasons for declining submissions included the lack of information substantiating allegations and the consideration that the review would not further
the objectives of the corresponding FTA. Available at https://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/naalc.htm
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Figure 3. Actorness in public submissions and OTLA decisions.
precondition as different US administrations might re-
act more or less favorable to international labor rights.10
Also, being filed more than 15 years after the first com-
plaints and six years ago, they provide the same time pe-
riod for potential learning effects from preceding submis-
sions and leave enough room for procedural follow-ups,
respectively. Second, both address similar labor rights
concerns, which is a relevant precondition as certain la-
bor rights violationsmight be resolved easier than others,
thus influencing the complaints’ effectiveness.11
3.1. The NAALC and the CAFTA–DR Experience
The submission against Mexico presented to the OTLA
on November 14, 2011 consists of 71 pages, in which
the 94 complainants demonstrate how the Government
of Mexico has failed to uphold is commitments under
the NAALC by not taking action following the issuance
of a Presidential decree on October 2009, dissolving the
state-owned electrical power company, Central Light and
Power, and terminating the employment of over 44,000
SME members. In accordance with its Procedural Guide-
lines, the OTLA accepted the public submission for re-
view on January 13, 2012. On June 25, 2012 (and no-
ticed in the Federal Register notice on July 2, 2012), the
OTLA determined that an extension of time was neces-
sary for its review and issuing of a public report,12 nor-
mally due within a 180-day review period. The exten-
sion of time was mainly owing to a supplemental sub-
mission from the complainants on May 25, 2012, which
contained new allegations and required a thorough con-
sideration of the supplemental submission and of infor-
mation obtained after an OTLA fact-finding visit to Mex-
ico in March 2012.13 According to the Acting Associate
Deputy Undersecretary, USDOL, the case is ‘extremely
complicated, with a myriad of claims and documents in-
volved’.14 On February 1, 2013, after Supreme Court rul-
ings in Mexico against the SME, the submitters notified
the OTLA that they would submit additional information
based on recent developments.15 The OTLA still lists the
case as ‘currently under review’.16
In contrast to the very comprehensive Mexico sub-
mission under the NAALC, the complaint against the Do-
minican Government presented to the OTLA on Decem-
ber 22, 2011 by a priest features four pages only. The
OTLA accepted the submission for review on February
22, 2012. It was noted by the Acting Associate Deputy
Undersecretary, USDOL, that the Dominican submission
was—in contrast to the Mexican submission—‘sparsely
detailed’.17 In order to verify information on the ground,
the OTLA took two review trips (April and July) to the
Dominican Republic, in which the US delegation met
with government, business, and worker representatives.
As the OTLA received many comments on the case, it
decided to formalize the process by issuing a Federal
Register Note soliciting public comments. On August 20,
2012, the OTLA extended the review process due to the
amount of information it received.18 According to the
Acting Deputy Undersecretary, the delays were also due
to the complicated nature of the submission.19
10 Interview Trade and Globalization Policy Specialist, AFL-CIO, June 14, 2013.
11 Both labor rights complaints cite violations of core labor standards as defined by the ILO such as freedom of association and the right to organize.
12 See also https://www.dol.gov/ilab/submissions/pdf/MexicoSubmission2011.pdf
13 See also https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2012/07/02/2012-16140/north-american-agreement-on-labor-cooperation-notice-of-extensi
on-of-the-period-of-review-for
14 Acting Deputy Undersecretary, USDOL, as cited in Minutes of NAC Meeting, September 27, 2012, p. 13, available at https://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/
agreements/nac.htm
15 Minutes of NAC meeting, March 19, 2013, p. 10, available at https://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/nac.htm
16 See also https://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/naalc.htm
17 Minutes of NAC meeting, September 27, 2012, p. 16, available at https://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/nac.htm
18 Minutes of NAC meeting, September 27, 2012, p. 16, available at https://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/nac.htm
19 Minutes of NAC meetings, September 27, 2012, p. 16; March 19, 2013, p. 9, available at https://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/nac.htm
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The public report of review was finally released on
September 27, 2013. It finds evidence of apparent and
potential violations of labor law in the Dominican sugar
sector. They relate to acceptable conditions of work,
child labor, and forced labor. Moreover, the report doc-
uments concern with respect to Dominican labor law on
freedom of association, the right to organize, and collec-
tive bargaining, and with respect to shortcomings in la-
bor inspections. To address these limitations, the report
offers eleven recommendations, the implementation of
which will be reviewed six and twelve months after pub-
lication. In fact, since issuing the public report, the OTLA
has published five periodic reviews between April 2014
and October 2016 concerning the recommendations’ im-
plementation. While these reports reveal improvements
for decentwork, theUS still deems certain issues not fully
addressed by the Dominican Government.20
3.2. David Against Goliath? Influence of Actorness on
Decent Work
Comparing the public submissions against the Mexican
Government under the NAALC and against the Domini-
can Government under the CAFTA–DR, it can be said
that the latter is more far-reaching in terms of the pro-
cedural steps taken by the US so far, as it has been ac-
cepted for review and produced a public report with pre-
cise recommendations that have been regularly moni-
tored. This is in contrast to the formulated hypotheses
which expect professionalism, collectivism, and transna-
tionalism to be more conducive to successful labor ad-
vocacy than non-professionalism, individualism, and na-
tionalism. This section will provide a discussion on how
the nature of the complainants contributed to this rather
surprising outcome.
In contrast to the NAALC submission, the CAFTA–DR
submission was not backed by trade unions or their con-
federations with professional expertise and experience
on labor rights enforcement. In fact, Father Hartley did
not seek support by Dominican trade unions as he per-
ceived of unions in the sugar sector as being reluctant
to fight for rights of workers with Haitian ethnic back-
ground. Instead, he collected relevant information on the
working conditions of laborers from the bateyes himself.
His engagement and expertise in the field of worker pro-
tection was also confirmed by the Director of the OTLA
to whom the case was addressed: ‘He [Father Christo-
pher Hartley] is a very dedicated person who worked
a number of years in the Dominican Republic….I would
characterize him as a person with a humanitarian con-
cern about rights of particularly Haitian workers, living
conditions. So, I [imagine] his motivation of helping the
poor, helping those who are disadvantaged, [seeking jus-
tice in] bringing the case forward. I see that passion in
his interactions with us’.21 In addition to his expertise
from the ground, Father Hartley was able to acquire ex-
perience with international systems of labor protection
by dealing with enforcement procedures in alternative
venues beforehand. He expressed concerns to EU au-
thorities in the context of the EU-CARIFORUM Economic
Partnership Agreement in 2009 and later in 2013, who
took the issues seriously and reached out to Domini-
can authorities, among other measures (Oehri, 2017,
pp. 138–139). Father Hartley also presented a formal
complaint to Bonsucro—a non-profit multi-stakeholder
organization for sustainable sugar cane production—as a
result of which three major sugar cane producers in the
Dominican Republic were forced to abandon their mem-
bership. Moreover, Father Hartley has been surrounded
and supported by experts of international affairs and the
US complaint procedure, including former deputy assis-
tant of the USDOL and former ambassador of the EU in
the Dominican Republic.22
This engagement, even if ‘not necessarily…linked to
the labor movement’,23 resulted in a public submission
that was able to meet the criteria as requested by the US
OTLA to be accepted for review. Themissing evidence for
the public review was gathered by OTLA officials them-
selves, including fact finding visits and public information
procedures. While the AFL-CIO was not a party to the
case, it nevertheless submitted confirming information
on the labor rights allegations through the possibility for
public comments.24
As he could compensate for the lack of trade unions’
professionalism, Father Hartley also managed to gain
from the non-collective nature of his submission: ‘The
fact that I was an individual’, as Father Hartley claims,
‘was not necessarily detrimental. Of course, being an in-
dividual, it became a very attractive story to the media.
And the media, much more than trade unions or human
rights organization, have beenmymost powerful allies in
advancing the course of Haitian migrant workers of the
sugar cane fields of the Dominican Republic’. He further
believes that the case ‘wouldn’t be so attractive as a me-
dia story if this was Amnesty International or some un-
known organization…defending the labor of the Haitian
migrant workers. So it has not been entirely to my disad-
vantage. From the media standpoint, newspapers, docu-
mentaries, you name it, it’s a very effective story, it’s a
bit like David against Goliath’. As far as the follow-up pro-
cedure of the public submission to the US is concerned,
Father Hartley comments that the USDOL was experi-
encing an enormous pressure from the media to do the
right thing.
The limited legitimacy an individual submitter faces
could be compensated by Father Hartley as he func-
tioned as a mouthpiece for a work force who lacked a
voice itself. However, what Father Hartley could not es-
20 See also https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/trade/fta-submissions
21 Interview, Director, OTLA, USDOL, June 12, 2013.
22 Interview, Christopher Hartley, April 11, 2013; see also https://clarkson-montesinos.org/our-team-2
23 Interview, Director of the International Department, AFL-CIO, June 17, 2013.
24 Interview, Trade and Globalization Policy Specialist, AFL-CIO, June 14, 2013.
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cape from were negative personal consequences for his
engagement in the fight for workers’ rights. His longtime
campaign to end illicit labor conditions in the Dominican
Republic ended with his expulsion from the country in
October 2006.25
In contrast to the Mexican submission, the Domini-
can submission was not presented by a transnational ad-
vocacy network. Father Hartley did not seek assistance
in the development of a formal complaint by US orga-
nizations such as the AFL-CIO. He had the impression
that they had not shown any interest in the story.26
The AFL-CIO became aware of this initiative only a few
days before the submission.27 However, the Dominican
case suggests that a lack of transnational advocacy does
not necessarily mean a lack of transnational awareness
and pressure. In fact, given that the priest had pre-
sented a similar concern to EU authorities beforehand,
officials from the EU and the US have been familiar
with each other’s cases and observed each other’s reac-
tions.28 Moreover, international human rights organiza-
tions such as Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch became aware of the story and published corre-
sponding reports, thereby reaching out to a global au-
dience.29 Besides, the public report resulting from the
formal complaint prompted awareness of multinational
companies of the illicit labor conditions of sugar pro-
ducers in the Dominican Republic. The Director of the
Global Workplace Rights at The Coca-Cola Company, for
instance, reiterated that the public report was useful for
their work in remediating the Dominican sugar indus-
try.30 Also, the same day in September 2013 the USDOL
presented its public report, it announced a USD 10 mil-
lion project in the Dominican agriculture sector as part of
its commitment to engage with the Government of the
Dominican Republic to address the concerns raised in the
public submission (Oehri, 2017, p. 75). It remains unclear
whether this cooperation project would have been initi-
ated without a public submission and following investi-
gations in the Dominican Republic under the aegis of the
CAFTA–DR.
4. Conclusions
In a recent assessment of labor standards in trade and in-
vestment agreements, the ILO (2016) concluded that ‘the
impact of labour provisions depends crucially on…the ex-
tent to which they involve stakeholders, notably social
partners’, among other factors. This study is designed to
better understand the nature of civil society actors as
a potential influencing variable to decent work. Draw-
ing on a multidisciplinary framework of actorness, it re-
veals that the majority of submissions presented at the
US in the context of FTAs are signed by professional,
collective, and transnational parties. Interestingly, non-
professional submissions were accepted as legal cases
more often than professional ones in relative terms
whereas collective and transnational submissions were
comparatively more successful than individual and na-
tional ones. These findings are partly substantiated by
the insights of twomost different cases, in which the sub-
mission of an individual priest was more far-reaching in
terms of procedural steps than the submission signed by
a collective of over 90 national and international trade
unions and other organizations. Thereby, and in addition
to further developing extant literature on non-state ac-
tors’ access (Keohane et al., 2000; Tallberg et al., 2014) by
investigating their practical participation, this study’s em-
phasis on the risks and potentials the nature of actorness
entails for successful labor rights advocacy gives confi-
dence and guidance to civil society actors who witness
illicit labor practices in signatory countries to US FTAs.
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